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It is often taken to be a truism of contemporary political 
philosophy that the “communitarians” of the second half of the 
20th century were advocating a political position in opposition to 
that of political liberalism. While philosophers who have been 
labeled as communitarians—namely Michael Sandel, Alasdair 
MacIntyre, Charles Taylor, and Michael Walzer—routinely es-
chew the label and the contrast drawn with liberals, the percep-
tion of a dichotomy persists. But a more careful reading of the 
philosophy of communitarians shows that these thinkers are not 
necessarily opposed to liberalism, but rather “atomism,” which 
Charles Taylor defines as “a vision of society in some sense con-
stituted by individuals for the fulfilment (sic) of ends which [are] 
primarily individual.”i 
 A major critique, however, of the opponents of atomism is 
that they have yet to put forth an adequate positive alternative to 
atomism. While thinkers like Sandel, Taylor, and MacIntyre have 
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worked hard to show why atomism is a flawed political ap-
proach, and while Michael Walzer has put forth a positive theo-
ry in Spheres of Justice that largely draws from atomist presuppo-
sitions, a clear positive anti-atomist doctrine has as of yet not 
been put forth. 
 However, some important groundwork has been laid. A key 
point of agreement amongst these philosophers is that ethical-
political systems depend on certain metaphysical conceptions of 
the human person. As Michael Sandel puts it, “our practices and 
institutions are embodiments of theory. To engage in a political 
practice is already to stand in relation to theory.”ii Some meta-
physical understanding of the human person is required to pro-
vide a foundation for any positive anti-atomist political theory. 
This paper will take two theories, one an analogy from language 
used by Charles Taylor and another an explanation of basic 
qualities of human society put forth by Alasdair MacIntyre, and 
argue that they provide a foundation on which a positive anti-
atomist political theory can be constructed. 
 
MacIntyre on Human Dependence 
 Before addressing the themes that emerge from the two theo-
ries, I will first explain the two theories as they are put forth by 
MacIntyre and Taylor. Alasdair MacIntyre’s concept of 
“networks of giving and receiving” comes from his book Depend-
ent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues. This 
book marks MacIntyre’s full shift from his original thesis in After 
Virtue claiming that the need for the virtues can be culturally de-
termined to the much stronger claim that the virtues that are 
needed for human flourishing are essentially tied to the needs of 
human nature. In order to explain this, MacIntyre appeals to the 
realities of human dependence. He presents his work as a chal-
lenge to the history of philosophy, a history riddled with as-
sumptions of the “ability” of humans: 
From Plato to Moore and since there are usually, 
with some rare exceptions, only passing refer-
ences to human vulnerability and affliction and to 
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the connections between them and our depend-
ence on others…And when the ill, the injured and 
the otherwise disabled are (emphasis in original) 
presented in the pages of moral philosophy 
books, it is almost always exclusively as possible 
subjects of benevolence by moral agents who are 
themselves presented as though they were contin-
uously rational, healthy and untroubled.iii 
MacIntyre’s claim is that we are, by our human nature, locked in 
what he terms “networks of giving and receiving.” At some 
times (notably in developmental stages, periods of illness, and 
old age), we are bound by our limited nature and must depend 
on the aid of others. At others, we serve as the providers of aid 
by helping others in their times of dependence. 
 Further, MacIntyre argues that participation in these net-
works of giving and receiving are essential to human flourishing. 
Not only do “we become independent practical reasoners 
through participation in a set of relationships to certain particu-
lar others who are able to give us what we need,”iv but we must 
also “understand that what [we are] called upon to give may be 
quite disproportionate to what [we] have received and that those 
to whom [we are] called upon to give may well be those from 
whom [we] shall receive nothing.”v Thus, human flourishing 
grows not only out of acknowledging the dependence one has on 
others, but also in acknowledging the obligation one then has to 
aid others in their times of dependence. 
 
Taylor on Social Embeddedness 
 Taylor’s take on human flourishing can be found in his essay 
“Irreducibly Social Goods.” Here, he argues that there are certain 
goods that cannot be fully described in reference to particular 
individuals, but only towards more than one individual. He con-
trasts these irreducibly social goods with the concept of a “public 
good,” or a good that could theoretically apply solely to individ-
uals. With this distinction, he explains that public goods are 
simply private goods that are practically acquired through pub-
lic activity while irreducibly social goods cannot be attained but 
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through social means. His example to expose this distinction is 
that of the difference between the good of national defense and 
the good of friendship. National defense is a public good, or a 
good that is practically acquired through public activity but theo-
retically could exist on an individual basis. If a household were 
to raise its own army, it could, at least in theory, protect itself 
and only itself. Friendship, on the other hand, is a good that can 
only be experienced socially. A friendship that is experienced by 
a single individual would not be seen as a good, but rather as a 
misunderstanding of the very definition of what it is to have a 
friendship. 
Of special importance to this essay, Taylor goes on to take 
a distinction from the linguistic world and apply it to the devel-
opment of individuality. The concept he borrows is that of langue 
and parole first put forth by Ferdinand de Saussure in his Course 
in General Linguistics. According to Saussure, “language has an 
individual aspect and a social aspect. One is not conceivable 
without the other.”vi In the same way that Saussure argues that 
language is both social and individual, Taylor argues that identi-
ty is as well.  
 Saussure explains the social and individual aspects of lan-
guage as embedded in a system of interaction between langue 
and parole. Langue is the shared background of rules and lexicon 
of a language that make up the foundation on which a language 
is built. Any instance of the language is termed parole, or the us-
age of the langue in an actual speech act. Any act of parole is de-
pendent on the langue since it needs to follow certain rules in or-
der to be understood in a speech context. Parole, however, can 
also go back and change the langue by providing new twists on 
how to use language. Thus, instances must be built off the rules 
already provided but can also change those same rules. 
 In this analogy with the Saussurian distinction, culture plays 
the part of langue and the individual plays the part of the parole. 
Individual identity necessarily grows out of a culture and thus 
depends on that culture to come into being. But just as parole can 
then go back and alter langue in Saussure’s language distinction, 
so too can (and almost inevitably will) an individual change the 
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culture that the individual comes out of. Thus, the individual 
completes the dialectic by returning to the culture and working 
to make some sort of impact on it. 
 These two systems can be seen as complementing one anoth-
er in order to provide the basis for a positive anti-atomist politi-
cal theory. This basis consists of two essential metaphysical prin-
ciples: human independence in identity construction and human 
interdependence in realizing goods and flourishing. 
 
Identity Construction 
 We will first consider the part that interdependence plays in 
identity construction in both theories. This comes to light in the 
langue/parole distinction in the explanation of how parole comes 
into being. According to Taylor, “the acts of parole all presuppose 
the existence of langue.”vii Here, he is referring to instances with-
in a language. No statement can be made in any meaningful way 
if there is not a langue first for the statement to stand on. Even if 
someone were to emit sounds that directly mirrored a sentence 
from another language, if that someone did not know the lan-
guage then we would not consider that person to be truly engag-
ing in that language with that emission of sound. 
 The importance of culture in the development of an individ-
ual can be seen by the counterexample of feral children. A feral 
child is a child who develops in isolation from human society. 
While some feral children, if found at a young enough age, can 
be raised to grow out of many of their animalistic tendencies, 
most feral children are never able to grow into “normal” capaci-
ties of reasoning, language, and empathy. The example of feral 
children undergirds the essential social nature of human devel-
opment that depends on a culture and the nurture of others in 
order to be fulfilled.  
 MacIntyre’s view falls in line with this reasoning. “Networks 
of giving and receiving” is about taking into account the fact that 
human beings depend on others throughout their developmental 
stages in order to grow into independent practical reasoners and 
to establish personal identities. MacIntyre makes this clear when 
he says “We become independent practical reasoners through 
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participation in a set of relationships to certain particular others 
who are able to give us what we need.”viii 
 But further than this, MacIntyre does not underplay the im-
portance of culture in the successful construction of individual 
identities. MacIntyre makes it clear that “defective systems of 
social relationships are apt to produce defective character.”ix 
Thus, it is not only important that human beings have positive 
relationships with individuals towards their development, but 
that these positive relationships exist upon a background of cul-
ture that reinforces the individual relationships of note. 
 
Human Flourishing 
 On the other end of the construction of identity is the end of 
identity: the pursuit of human flourishing. Both the langue/parole 
distinction as well as networks of giving and receiving show a 
system in which human flourishing is intimately involved. Since 
the concept of human flourishing is foundationally Aristotelian, I 
will begin with an explanation of how contemporary Aristotelian 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s networks of giving and receiving treats hu-
man flourishing. 
 MacIntyre follows Aristotle’s line of reasoning in maintaining 
that human flourishing is a matter of realization of goods. On the 
one hand, individuals must grow into independent practical rea-
soners in order to engage in decision-making as to how to fulfill 
goods. But more than that, people must find good through tak-
ing part in the good of others. 
So each of us achieves our good only if and inso-
far as others make our good their good by helping 
us through periods of disability to become our-
selves the kind of human being—through acquisi-
tion and exercise of the virtues—who makes the 
good of others her or his good, and this not be-
cause we have calculated that, only if we help oth-
ers, will they help us, in some trading of ad-
vantage for advantage.x 
Thus, obtaining the goods that lead to human flourishing is 
something that will take place when one makes others’ ends 
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one’s own ends rather than making others’ ends simply a means 
to one’s own ends. MacIntyre later says that “the individual in 
order not just to pursue, but even to define her or his good in 
concrete terms has first to recognize the goods of the community 
as goods that she or he must make her own.”xi The realization of 
dependence and the reconciliation of the needs of others be-
comes a crucial part of flourishing in networks of giving in re-
ceiving. Note that MacIntyre here also hints at the importance of 
community input on the value of goods towards the individual 
when saying that others are required to allow an individual to 
“define her or his good in concrete terms.” 
 In order to understand how langue/parole gives the same ac-
count of human interdependence that networks of giving and 
receiving does, it is instructive to consider the relationship as a 
Hegelian dialectic. The barebones of the dialectic run like this: 
the langue preexists an act of parole, and the parole emerges as an 
instance of the langue. The fulfillment of the dialectic is for the 
parole to then make an impact that changes the langue, thus dou-
bling back and taking part in the langue. 
 Thus also do human beings work in such a manner. We grow 
out of the langue of culture, dependent on the culture around us 
to construct an individual identity, but that identity ultimately 
must be expressed through changing the culture it grew out of. 
This may be in a big, fundamental way or in a small, locally sig-
nificant way, but a human life that does not ultimately make any 
change in the culture it is a part of is a human life unfulfilled. 
 For Taylor, this embeddedness of the concept of human 
flourishing is also related to irreducibly social goods. Goods such 
as community, marriage, and friendship can only be realized in 
concert with others. There is no such thing as a community of 
one, or a friendship shared between one person. Further, these 
goods are fundamentally important to human nature, and just 
like MacIntyre’s “common goods,” can only be achieved by in-
vesting in them as ends in themselves rather than means to-
wards a private good. As distinctly social animals, exposure to 
irreducibly social goods figures strongly into the ability of hu-
man beings to flourish. 
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Differences Between the Theories 
 While the two theories complement each other to a signifi-
cant extent, there are also some instances in which the two theo-
ries seem, on surface level, inconsistent. This section will explain 
the reason these discrepancies exist and show why the two theo-
ries do not have any differences that are irreconcilable. 
 The first discrepancy of note is that of differing focii of rela-
tionships within the theories. For Taylor’s theory of langue and 
parole, the key relationship is between the individual and the cul-
ture. An individual both grows out of a culture but also takes 
part in the changing of that culture. MacIntyre’s account of inter-
dependence, however, is much more concerned with the interac-
tions between individuals than the interactions between the indi-
vidual and a culture. While these could be seen as ideas in con-
flict, it would be a more true reading of the two thinkers to see 
the two theories as complementing one another by fleshing out 
ideas alluded to in passing by one another. 
 In chapter four of Dependent Rational Animals, MacIntyre’s 
account of identity formation draws from George Herbert 
Mead’s behaviorist account of the formation of the self. While 
this can be accounted for by MacIntyre’s biological approach 
(focused on comparison of human interdependence with that of 
other animals), a connection must still be made within Mac-
Intyre’s system between identity and culture in order to draw a 
proper connection between the two theories. 
 Upon closer inspection, however, MacIntyre reveals that 
practices of individuals and exercise of individuality are depend-
ent on a background of cultural practices, a claim that mirrors 
Taylor’s account of langue. This becomes obvious with Mac-
Intyre’s explanation of common goods and individual goods. 
 According to MacIntyre, the pursuit of a personal good can-
not be fulfilled unless it takes place within the context of a com-
mon good. “The good of each cannot be pursued without also 
pursuing the good of all those who participate in those relation-
ships.”xii This ties in intimately with MacIntyre’s account of reci-
procity. Reciprocity, for MacIntyre, is not about giving back in 
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equal quantity to the people from whom one receives, but some-
times requires paying forward to others in disproportionate 
amounts.xiii 
 Reliance on common goods is not only about reciprocity, 
though: it goes deeper than that. Let us return to a quote from 
Dependent Rational Animals provided earlier:  “the individual in 
order not just to pursue, but even to define his or her good in 
concrete terms has first to recognize the goods of the community 
as goods that she or he must make her own.”xiv According to 
MacIntyre, there must be a background of value in order for an 
individual to even do as much as define a good for itself. 
 The second apparent discrepancy between the two theories is 
the treatment of the individual in the two doctrines. This, too, is 
a discrepancy that quite naturally comes out of the differing 
methodologies of the two thinkers. Taylor is a scholar of Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, a French Hegelian who provides a transcenden-
tal argument about embodied agency.xv The transcendental argu-
ment unfolds as follows. According to Merleau-Ponty, “to be a 
subject is to be aware of the world.”xvi Thus, our status as sub-
jects is dependent on a world around us that provides corre-
sponding objects. Taylor, therefore, is adopting a view of the in-
dividual as an “embodied agent,” distinct from any conception 
of human nature. 
 MacIntyre, on the other hand, is coming from a biologically 
based methodology. His understanding of the individual as a 
“dependent rational animal” is rooted in understanding human 
beings “as included in the class of animals.”xvii Rationality is one 
key quality of human beings that sets us apart from other ani-
mals.xviii Here, MacIntyre is providing an understanding of the 
individual that is based on how we talk about human beings as a 
biological species of animal. 
 While these two accounts are no doubt distinct in nature, 
they also fit together nicely when keying in on MacIntyre’s defi-
nition of “dependence.” Here, MacIntyre’s adoption of develop-
mental explanations similar to that of George Herbert Mead’s 
provides us a path for reconciliation. MacIntyre argues that we 
need others in order to gain thoughts and self-awareness.xix It is 
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through interaction with these others that we are then able to 
find a sense of self. Just as Mealeau-Ponty argued that the world 
provides objects that allow us to become a subject, MacIntyre 
channels Mead in order to show that we must be aware of others 
in order to gain a sense of selfhood. Thus, MacIntyre’s behavioral 
explanation of how identity is constructed comes very close to 
the transcendental argument of Merleau-Ponty that Taylor 
adopts. 
 Lastly, the writings of the two thinkers show different levels 
of clarity on their stances in regards to the argument that ethical/
political systems can indeed be grounded in metaphysical truths 
concerning the human person. While MacIntyre is arguing a 
strong case for metaphysical foundationalism (hoping to ground 
an account of human ethical-political systems based on human 
flourishing in a metaphysical biology of human nature), Taylor’s 
langue/parole distinction in “Irreducibly Social Goods” does not 
necessarily lend itself to espousing such a position. If Taylor is 
found to be an opponent of methodological foundationalism, 
then that would be a fatal blow to the project of reconciling 
langue/parole and networks of giving and receiving as a basis for 
a political theory. 
 Luckily, there is sufficient evidence in Taylor’s other work to 
suggest that he supports the thesis of metaphysical foundational-
ism. This becomes most apparent in Taylor’s treatment of the 
role of recognition in the life of the human person. According to 
Taylor,  
Our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its 
absence, often by the misrecognition (italics in 
original) of others, and so a person or group of 
people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if 
the people or society around them mirror back a 
confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of 
themselves.xx 
Here Taylor argues that a society that ignores the essentially hu-
man needs of its members will leave these members “damaged,” 
thus implying that the society has an obligation to make sure that 
its members receive the recognition necessary to form healthy 
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identities. This line of argument transposes very well onto the 
langue/parole distinction. If we, as embodied agents, come from 
the culture and then find fulfillment in expressing ourselves 
within the culture, then society has a certain obligation to rein-
force that culture and mold it in a way that is beneficial to its 
members. This is a foundationalist claim that draws an obliga-
tion of human society from a fact about the human person and 
suggests that Taylor is not hostile to the foundationalist ap-
proach. 
 
Two Metaphysical Principles 
 Above, one can see that the similarities between MacIntyre’s 
“networks of giving and receiving” and Taylor’s adoption of 
Saussure’s langue/parole provide two metaphysical ballasts for a 
positive anti-atomist political theory. First, individuals are not 
atomistically self-reliant in construction of selfhood, but rather 
are dependent on both individual others and on their culture in 
respect to their coming into being as selves with distinct, individ-
ual identities. Second, individuals cannot atomistically pursue 
individual goods without interacting with others, and thus are 
interdependent in respect to their flourishing as individuals. 
While the space for this paper does not allow for an explanation 
of the political ramifications of these two metaphysical princi-
ples, these two principles provide a foundation for a broader 
positive anti-atomist political theory that greatly improves on 
the current metaphysical assumptions of the atomist project. 
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